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Abstract—Many verification tools come out of academic
projects, whose natural constraints do not typically lead to a
strong focus on usability. For widespread use, however, usability is
essential. Using a well-known benchmark, the Tokeneer problem,
we evaluate the usability of a recent and promising verification
tool: AutoProof. The results show the efficacy of the tool in
verifying a real piece of software and automatically discharging
nearly two thirds of verification conditions. At the same time,
the case study shows the demand for improved documentation
and emphasizes the need for improvement in the tool itself and
in the Eiffel IDE.
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern systems have grown fast in complexity, and demand
for quality. Focus on quality, in turn, demands stronger atten-
tion to the entire development life-cycle. With the tendency
to reuse and integration, the need for software quality is even
more important since applications and components have to rely
on each other with partial knowledge of the implementation
and based on interface only.
Tools for software verification allow the application of the-
oretical principles in practice, in order to ensure that nothing
bad will ever happen (safety). The extra effort required by the
use of these tools is certainly not for free and comes with
increased development costs [1]. There is a common belief in
industry that developing software with high level of assurance
is too expensive, therefore not acceptable, especially for non
safety-critical or financially-critical applications.
Tools and techniques for the formal development of soft-
ware have played a key role on demystifying this belief. There
are several approaches, for instances abstract interpretation
and model checking [2], [3], that seek the automation to
formally proving certain conditions of systems. However,
these techniques tend to verify simple properties only. On the
other end of the spectrum, there are interactive techniques for
verification such theorem provers [4]. These techniques aim at
more complex properties, but demand the interaction of users
to help the verification.
Nowadays, there are new approaches that aim at finding
a good trade-off between both techniques, e.g. auto-active:
users are not needed during the verification process (it is
automatically performed); they are required instead to provide
guidance to the proof using annotations. AutoProof [5], is a
static auto-active verifier for functional properties of object-
oriented programs. Using AutoProof, users write code and
equip classes with contracts and annotations to help the tool
to prove certain properties.
The main goal resented in this paper is to provide insights on
how easy/difficult is for users (mainly engineers without deep
knowledge of formal verification) to use current methodologies
and tools for the development of software with high level of
assurance, in particular on the use of the AutoProof tool.
Generally, to prove the correctness of a program one needs
some mechanisms to express what the program is supposed to
do and clearly state it in the specifications that are used later
to verify the program. Eiffel programming language natively
supports these mechanisms by means of contracts. Eiffel
is an object-oriented programming language which directly
implements the concepts of Design-by-Contract (DbC) [1], [6].
The key concept is viewing the relationship between a class
and its clients as a formal agreement, expressing each party’s
rights and obligations. This is realized equipping methods with
pre- and post-conditions, and classes with invariants. The key
feature of the Eiffel language is indeed the idea that all the
methods might and should contain contracts.
Contracts and annotations used in Eiffel are used by Au-
toProof to statically verify the consistency of the classes. To
demonstrate the usability of the tool, the Tokeneer project [7]
was implemented in Eiffel and AutoProof was used to verify
the consistency of the code. The Tokeneer project is a sys-
tem specified and implemented by National Security Agency
(NSA). Initially, NSA carried out this challenge to prove that
it is possible to develop secure systems rigorously in a cost
effective manner. Since its development, it became a testing
range for different software development methodologies and
verification tools. Results of the project are publicly available.
This paper reports on the use of AutoProof to verify an
Eiffel implementation of Tokeneer and also reports on how
easy/difficult is for users to use the tool, e.g. the burden of
helping the tool by means of annotations in the code.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
introduces the Tokeneer project, Eiffel and the AutoProof
tool. Section III describes the methodology used to verify the
implementation of the Tokeener project. Section IV presents
empirical results helping to draw conclusions. Section V
is devoted to related work and Section VI concludes and
mentions future work.
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Fig. 1. The Tokeneer System
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. The Tokeneer Project
In 2002, with the aim to prove/disprove the common believe
in industry that development of software of high level of
assurance is too expensive and therefore not feasible, the
National Security Agency (NSA) asked Altran to undertake a
research project to develop part of an existing secure system,
the Tokeneer System, in accordance with Altran’s Correctness
by Construction development process. The system was spec-
ified using Z notation [8] and implemented in Ada [9]. The
project was successfully delivered in 2003 within 260 days of
effort, and later, in 2008, all the results were made available by
NSA to the software development and security communities in
order to demonstrate the possibility to develop secure systems
in a cost effective manner. It includes the “Core” Tokeneer
ID System Software, test cases derived from the system test
specification, “Support” Tokeneer ID System Software and
test tokens and biometric data, project documents. Since the
delivery, the Tokeneer project has become a milestone point
and a testing range for different verification tools before
applying them in industrial projects. Despite the fact that after
delivery 4 bugs1 were found, the system is still deemed to be
very secure.
Tokeneer is a secure enclave consisting of a set of system
components, some housed inside the enclave and some outside,
as depicted in Figure 1. The ID Station (TIS) is part of the
larger Tokeneer system. It has four connected peripherals,
namely, a fingerprint reader, a smartcard reader (users use To-
kens -smartcards- as identification), a door and visual display.
The objective of the enclave is to ensure that anyone who
enters the enclave has a proper access, and no one else can
access to the enclave.
1According to [7]
In order to ensure the entrance of users to the enclave, TIS
implements a series of protocols and checks (the use of smart
cards and biometrics) to grant or deny the entrance to it. This
paper discusses one of these protocols: the Enrollment to the
ID Station. The protocol starts in a state where the user is
not enrolled. Users can request enrollment and then insert a
FLOPPY (it retains an internal view of the last data written)
for the system to proceed. The system reads the information
in the floppy and either fails the enrollment process, in which
case takes the process to the initial state, or correctly validates
the data in the floppy.
B. Eiffel
Eiffel is a real complex object oriented programming lan-
guage that natively supports Design-by-Contract methodology.
Users can specify the behavior of Eiffel classes by equipping
them with contracts: pre- and post-conditions and class invari-
ants, that are represented as assertions.
class
ACCOUNT
create make
feature−− Initialization
make −−Initialize empty account.
do
balance := 0
ensure
balance set: balance = 0
end
feature−− Access
balance : INTEGER −− Balance of account.
feature−− Element change
deposit (amount : INTEGER)
−− Deposit ‘amount’ on account.
require
amount not negative : amount >= 0
do
balance := balance + amount
ensure
balance increased : balance =
old balance + amount
end
withdraw (amount : INTEGER)
−− Withdraw ‘amount’ from account.
require
enough balance : amount <= balance
do
balance := balance - amount
ensure
balance decreased : balance = old balance - amount
end
invariant
non negative balance : balance >= 0
end
Fig. 2. ACCOUNT Eiffel class
Figure 2 depicts a reduced implementation of a Bank
Account. In Eiffel, creation procedures are listed under the
keyword create, for class ACCOUNT, routine make is used
as a creation procedure. The class defines a class attribute
balance to represent the current balance of the account. It also
defines two routines (methods), deposit and withdraw. de-
posit implements a deposit of amount amount of money to the
account and withdraw implements withdrawing money. Eiffel
encourages software developers to express formal properties of
classes by writing assertions. Routine pre-conditions express
the requirements that clients must satisfy whenever they call a
routine. They are introduced in Eiffel by the keyword require.
Routine deposit imposes a pre-condition on the call, the
client must pass as an argument a non-negative number (i.e.
amount not negative: amount >= 0) for the routine to
work correctly: a negative value might invalidate the invariant
of the class. Routine post-conditions, introduced in Eiffel
by the keyword ensure, express conditions that the routine
(the supplier) guarantees on method exit, assuming the pre-
condition. Routine deposit guarantees that the balance of the
account will be the previous value of the balance (expressed
in Eiffel by the keyword old: the value on entrance of the
routine) plus the amount being deposited. Routine withdraw
imposes the constraint to the caller that the argument must be
less than or equal to the current balance of the account to avoid
having negative value in the balance. The routine ensures that,
after execution, the new value of balance will be the value
on routine entry minus the amount withdrawn.
A class invariant must be satisfied by every instance of
the class whenever the instance is externally accessible: after
creation, and after any call to an exported routine of the
class (public routines). The invariant appears in a clause
introduced by the keyword invariant. Class ACCOUNT’s
invariant imposes the restriction that class attribute balance
can never be negative (i.e. non negative balance: balance
>= 0).
C. AutoProof
AutoProof [5] is a static verifier of contracts for Eiffel
programs. It follows the auto-active paradigm where verifica-
tion is done completely automated, similar to model checking
[3], but users are expected to feed the classes providing
additional information in the form of annotations to help the
proof. AutoProof identifies software issues without the need
of executing the code, therefore opening a new frontier for
“static debugging”, software verification and reliability, and in
general for software quality.
AutoProof verifies the functional correctness of Eiffel
classes. It translates Eiffel code to Boogie programs [10] and
calls the Boogie tool to generate verification conditions: logic
formulas whose validity entails correctness of the input pro-
grams. Finally, retrieves the answer back to Eiffel. AutoProof
verifies that routines satisfy pre- and post-conditions, mainte-
nance of class invariants, loops and recursive calls termination,
integer overflow and non Void (null in other programming
languages) references calls. The tool also supports most of
class
ID STATION
. . . Some lines were omitted. . .
create
make
feature−−Initialization
make
note
status : creator
do
. . . Some lines were omitted. . .
end
end
Fig. 3. Initialisation of ID STATION Eiffel class.
the Eiffel language constructs: in-lined assertions such as
check (assert in other programming languages), types, multi-
inheritance, polymorphism.
III. VERIFICATION OF TOKENEER USING AUTOPROOF
The Tokeneer project was implemented in Eiffel following
the specifications file 41 2.pdf (see [7]) of the Tokeneer
System and equipping classes with contracts. This research
work encompasses only the enrolment process of the whole
Tokeneer System therefore it implements only the entities
involved in this process.
One of the main parts of TIS is the ID STATION (see
Figure 8) - it describes how all components of the system are
related to each other: one of the components is implemented in
class INTERNAL S (not shown here) whose responsibility is
to keep knowledge of the status of user entry and the enclave
and to hold a timeout when relevant; another component is
implemented on class FLOPPY (not shown here) that retains
an internal view of the last data written to the floppy as
well as the current data on the floppy. ID STATION displays
the configuration data on the screen which is implemented
in SCREEN DISPLAY. There are a number of messages
that may appear on the TIS screen. The Real World types
(described in [7] Specification document, section 2.7.1) of
the system such as messages that appear on the display and
screen, were implemented all together in class CONST which
implements the constants used in the TIS. And finally, a
number of interactions between all these entities within the
enclave are implemented in ENCLAVE OPERS.
AutoProof does not make any assumptions out of box there-
fore users are expected to feed the Eiffel classes for a succeed
verification. This is expressed by means of Eiffel’s note clause.
note clause enables users to attach addition information to the
class that is ignored by the Eiffel’s compiler. AutoProof uses
this information to succeed in the verification. For instance,
Autoproof’s annotation status defines which procedure is used
to initialize newly created objects: Figure 3 depicts procedure
make with annotation note (e.g. note status: creator) to help
Autoproof to discharge the corresponding proof obligations
related to creation procedures: the procedure will be called
RequestEnrolment
EnrolContext
ΞKeyStore
ΞAuditLog
ΞInternal
enclaveStatus = notEnrolled
floppyPresence = absent
currentScreen′.screenMsg = insertEnrolmentData
currentDisplay′ = blank
Fig. 4. Z schema of RequestEnrolment
make
. . . Some lines were omitted. . .
ensure
enclave status = cons floppy.not enrolled
floppy presence = cons internal.absent
token removal timeout = 0
end
Fig. 5. ensure clause in feature make
only when an object of this class is being created, AutoProof
needs to verify a creation routine only once.
note clause is also used to define models queries to express
the abstract state space of a classes. Model queries are part of
model-based contracts to help users to write abstract and con-
cise specifications [11], they are used to specify the behavior
of the class. In Eiffel, this is specified by adding a note clause
at the beginning of the class followed with a keyword model:
and listing one or more attributes of the class. Model queries
are also used to describe frame conditions: which allocations
are allowed to be modified by procedures. In Eiffel, frame
conditions are listed using the modify clause, which lists the
model queries that the feature is allowed to modify, as shown
in Figure 7 (i.e. modify model(”current display”, Current)).
According to RequestEnrolment (a Z-schema that is a
part of the formal specification of the project Tokeneer),
which is presented in Figure 4, requesting enrolment involves
EnrolContext, KeyStore, AuditLog, Internal. Schemas in Z
consist of an upper part, in which some variables are declared,
and a lower part, which describes the relationship between
values and variables. The notation Ξ indicates an operation in
which the state does not change, and the apostrophe indicates
the state of the variable after the change [12]. RequestEn-
rolment specifies that the ID station will request enrolment
by displaying a request string on the screen and keeping
the display blank. This is only possible while there is no
Floppy present. Therefore, initially floppyPresence = absent
and enclaveStatus set to notEnrolled. An ensure clause was
used in the creation procedure to guarantee this after the
initialization of ID STATION object:
invariant
constants.display message.has(current display)
constants /= Void
Fig. 6. Invariants of ID STATION Eiffel class.
feature−−Element Change
set current display(v: STRING)
require
constants.display message.has(v)
modify model(”current display”, Current)
do
current display := v
ensure
current display = v
end
Fig. 7. Feature equipped with modify clause
Figure 6 depicts the class invariant for class ID STATION.
It states that a message displayed on the display outside the en-
clave is one of the available from the list of messages (i.e. con-
stants.display message.has(current display)) and that
class attribute constants is attached to an object (i.e. con-
stants /= Void).
Figure 7 shows the implementation of procedure
set current display. Its first pre-condition was added
to satisfy the invariant ensuring that argument v belongs to
the allowed displayed messages. The second pre-condition
restricts the procedure to change values only to model query
current display.
Figure 8 shows the final version of class ID STATION:
with the respective annotations for Autoproof to successfully
verify the class. In class ID STATION, class attributes cur-
rent screen and current display implements the physical
screen and display, respectively, of the enclave.
IV. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
The usability of a verification tool cannot be considered
in isolation and, in particular, cannot be hived off by the
effectiveness of the tool itself. First, as a general observation,
the cost of using an instrument can only be justified by its re-
turn, which can ultimately be linked to financial consideration
by top management. Second, and this aspect is less general
and more peculiar to the auto-active verification approach,
a tool like AutoProof is as much effective and usable as
is its ability to discharge verification conditions completely
automatically, without feeding the code of annotation overhead
or requiring particular tweaking. Finally, the necessity for
users to add further annotations and dedicate extra effort
(and considerable time) is, by itself, an obstacle to adoption
and (technically) an usability issue. Verification tools should
require minimal annotational effort and give valuable feedback
when verification fails.
The case study analyzed in this paper presented good results
in term of automatic discharge of verification conditions,
class
ID STATION
. . . Some lines were omitted. . .
create
make
feature−−Initialization
make
note
status: creator
do
create constants
current display := constants.blank
create current screen.make
create cons floppy
enclave status := cons floppy.not enrolled
token removal timeout := 0
create cons internal
floppy presence := cons internal.absent
ensure
enclave status = cons floppy.not enrolled
floppy presence = cons internal.absent
token removal timeout = 0
end
feature−−Element Change
set current display(v: STRING)
require
constants.display message.has(v)
modify model(”current display”, Current)
do
current display := v
ensure
current display = v
end
feature−−Access
constants : CONST
current screen : SCREEN DISPLAY
current display : STRING
invariant
constants.display message.has(current display)
constants /= Void
end
Fig. 8. Verified ID STATION Eiffel class.
though not comparable to others seen in literature [13]. In
total there were 38 generated proof. Of these, 22 (58%) were
discharged automatically, 8 (21%) could not be satisfied, and
the rest (21%) failed due to internal errors, which in our case
were basically caused by the attempt to create objects in the
contract, and that is not allowed by the tool. As observed
before, the success of verification is unsurprisingly linked to
the complexity of programs [13]. Previous literature mostly
dealt with students users and university projects. The use of
Tokeener as a benchmark demands for detailed comparisons
with different verification efforts (for example, [14]).
V. RELATED WORK
Formal/mathematical notations have existed for a long time
and have been used to specify and verify systems. Examples
are process algebras [15], specification languages like Z [16],
B [17] and Event-B [18]. The Vienna Development Method
(VDM) is one of the earliest attempts to establish a formal
method for the development of computer systems [19]. A
survey of these (and others) formalisms can be found in [20]
while a discussion on the methodological issues of a number
of formal methods is presented in [21].
All these approaches (and others described in the literature)
still leave an open issue, i.e., they are built around strict
formal notations which affect the development process from
the very beginning. These approaches demonstrate a low
level of flexibility. To overcome this problem, a seamless
methodological connection built on top of a portfolio of
diverse notations and methods is presented in [22]. Another
approach is presented in [14], [23] using [24], where users
start the development of system from a strict formal notation
(i.e. Event-B), to then automatically translate it to Java code
with JML [25] specifications embedded (following Design-by-
Contract methodology). Even though this approach enables
users with less mathematical expertise to work on formal
development, it does not give a seamlessly methodology for
the development as presented in this paper.
On the other side, Design-by-contract [6] when combined
with AutoProof technology offers the pros of both rigorous
methodologies and supporting tools able to semi-automate the
process. Before this to be available for the average developer
it is however necessary to improve the users’ experience.
A comparison between different approaches (for example
Event-b/Rodin and Design-by-contract/AutoProof) is beyond
the scope of this paper and it is left as future work.
VI. CONCLUSION
AutoProof allows for “static debugging”, i.e. debugging be-
comes possible without the need of executing the program. The
most effective way to release correct software is a combination
of static debugging and traditional run-time debugging. Being
all human activities (therefore including programming and
testing itself) error-prone, there is no magic or free lunches
out there. Abandoning testing and adopting a proof-oriented
approach does not make miracles, debugging remains a trial-
and-error long and laborious process. AutoProof does not
change the rules of the game: developers will have to try,
observe the results and make changes as a consequence. A
proof-oriented approach does not make the process smoother
and necessarily simpler. However, it makes it more accurate
and robust, therefore effective. Adjustment can be now focused
on the the implementation side (possibly sinergically with run-
time debugging), on the specification side (the contracts used
to annotate the code as integral part of the code itself), or in
the proof itself (fine-tuning may be necessary for AutoProof
and its behind-the-curtains machinery to be able to prove
correctly).
All this comes with a cost: the willingness and ability of
the user to use extra tools and being able to master them, and
possibly invest extra time in the process. On the other side, it
is necessary for the tools to be simple to master and to provide
intelligible feedback.
The Tokeener project case study showed the efficacy of
AutoProof in verifying a real piece of software, the complexity
of which can be compared not only with most of the commer-
cial Off-the-Shelf software, but also with safety and financial-
critical applications, both in terms of computational logic
and architectural organization. AutoProof is capable to verify
industrial software and may well be adopted in commercial
companies and its use injected into the development process.
However, some obstacles have been identified that could
prevent its broader adoption.
As result of an academic effort, documentation is not at par
with commercial software, in particular for what concerns the
size of the library of correctly verified examples: tutorials on
the official website are quite useful, but not enough. On top of
this, the tool itself has limitations. First, existing implementa-
tions need to be modified in order to be verified. This would
represent an unsurmountable obstacle in most institutions since
the overall cost of code adaptation may overrun the saves
occurring to the testing phase. This consideration may be
different, however, for safety-critical systems. Second, the
Eiffel IDE - necessary for functioning - calls for increased
stability and robustness.
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